Philosophical Theses I Find Equally Plausible

  1. Panpsychism.
  2. That “philosophical zombies” are metaphysically possible.
  3. That in some possible world, the history of Earth was entirely the same† as in the actual world, including all the movements and arrangements of organic macromolecules, but in which nothing was ever alive.  Like the zombie hypothesis, but they’re neither alive, nor conscious.

So far as I’m aware, no one has ever defended 3, but they have defended 1 & 2.  I’m increasingly convinced that it is only in a certain debased sense of “reasons” that there are reasons to believe 2 that are not reasons to believe 3.

† Of course one has to say boring things like “entirely the same, except for predicates that only characterize living things…” Like I’m gonna bother with that.

Shawn Wins Again: He suggests combining pansychism with the view that nothing is alive.  So you’d have conscious Justin shaped sacks of protoplasm running around not being alive.


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